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Abstract
A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are 
in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior 
to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of 
such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of 
knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Bren-
tano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author 
reveals the ontological framework in which it takes place. Doing so is instrumental to 
illuminating acquaintance, the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind 
and some other thing. The author discusses this state and shows how it has the epis-
temic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the foundations of one’s 
knowledge of the world. A naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge is open 
to a compelling objection; the author presents this objection with the means of un-
dermining it. In conclusion, the author recurs to the opening theme of the primacy of 
ontology and suggests that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are 
all based on questionable—and ultimately untenable—ontological presuppositions.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
Consider the world, the all-inclusive totality encompassing one. One might 
wonder whether this world or the things it comprises can be known as they 
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are in themselves, that is, as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. 
Of course, the only access one has to things is via the means one has to know 
them. It is not possible, then, simply to compare a thing in itself with that thing 
as it is known in order to determine whether knowing it corrupts it in some 
way. One only ever engages (and could only engage) the thing as it is known. 
Thus, the question here regarding the bounds of one’s knowledge of the world 
is whether to know a thing is ipso facto to modify it in some way—or construct 
it in the first place—or, at least, to introduce something mediate that might 
obscure that thing in itself.
In light of these considerations, it seems an answer to this crucial epistemo-
logical question is posterior to metaphysical investigation. Ontological inquiry 
is needed to determine what a thing, in the most inclusive sense, is.1 Determin-
ing this provides an account of what, in utmost generality, the thing is that is 
supposed to be knowable and what the thing is that enables knowledge. Such 
ontological inquiry would also yield insight into the ways in which things are 
related and how they can relate to one another. What is also needed is more 
specific metaphysical inquiry directed at that certain kind of thing that en-
ables knowledge of anything at all. Call such a thing a mind. Accounts of what 
a mind is and what it does would provide the basis of principled answers to 
how a mind can engage something in the world—how it enables knowledge—
and whether this engagement is compatible with knowledge of a thing in itself.
If addressing the crucial epistemological question regarding the bounds of 
knowledge requires some understanding of mind, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine the work of Franz Brentano. I believe this seminal work, the font of mod-
ern philosophy of mind, contains the theoretical resources for an account on 
which things can be known pristinely and without mediation of sense data, 
concepts or anything else, that is, as they are in themselves. The immediacy 
of this account of knowledge makes it a variety of direct realism, more specifi-
cally, it is a version of naïve realism;2 yet, in primary cases, one’s justification 
1 I take up such inquiry in my “What Is a Thing?”.
2 Direct realism is the general position according to which one has immediate (in some sense) 
access to mind-independent things via perceptual experience. Naïve realism is a specific ver-
sion of direct realism, according to which mind-independent objects—rather than represen-
tations thereof—are fundamental to an account of perceptual experience. Naïve realism can 
be contrasted with intentionalism (or representationalism), another version of direct realism. 
According to the intentionalist, a perceptual experience has accuracy conditions that must 
be met for that experience to be veridical; thus, the experience is fundamentally representa-
tional. Nonetheless, the experience does not involve the awareness of any representation or 
any intermediary. This is why the view is a version of direct realism. For a helpful discussion 
of these positions, see Genone 2016. In certain passages, Brentano seems to indicate that he 
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for believing things are as they appear is both non-inferential and internally 
accessible and so it is also a variety of traditional foundationalism.
Such a Brentanian account of knowing things in themselves might initially 
seem farfetched. There are supposed to be obvious problems with naïve re-
alism, stemming from cases of illusion or hallucination. For the last several 
decades, foundationalism has had to vie with a style of objection that is widely 
supposed to be damning. The combination of naïve realism and foundational-
ism is thought to give rise to yet further problems, which even contemporary 
proponents of foundationalism deem insuperable. Moreover, and perhaps 
most pointedly, it seems clear from Brentano’s best-known work that he rejects 
direct realism and, although he is a foundationalist, his foundationalism is of 
the sort that makes knowledge of anything beyond one’s own mental states 
seem problematic. So the prospects of a Brentanian directly realist founda-
tionalism might seem especially unpromising. Nonetheless, I argue that it is in 
Brentano’s work that one finds the means for this sort of account of knowledge.
In order to see this, one must bear in mind, as pointed out above, that onto-
logical issues—and more specific metaphysical ones pertaining to the nature of 
mind—are prior to epistemological ones, and appreciate that within a certain 
ontological framework standard objections to an account of knowing things 
in themselves are ineffectual. To the end of propounding this account, I first 
characterize, in §2, the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind. These 
resources are yielded by Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology, a project 
whose goals hide the ontological framework in which it takes place. In §3, I 
expose this framework. Doing so is instrumental to illuminating acquaintance, 
the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind and some other thing. 
I discuss this state in §4, and in the following section, §5, show how it has the 
epistemic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the founda-
tions of one’s knowledge of the world. A naïve realist, foundationalist account 
of knowledge is open to a compelling objection, based on the ostensible sub-
jective indistinguishability between veridical and non-veridical experiences. I 
present this objection in §6 with the means of undermining it. In the conclud-
ing §7, I recur to the opening theme of the primacy of ontology and suggest 
is an indirect realist, holding that one’s perceptual access to the world is mediated by a mental 
phenomenon. If so, Brentano is not a direct realist at all and, a fortiori, not an intentionalist 
in the sense relevant here (though he might be an intentionalist in some other sense). One of 
the purposes of this paper is to show how some of Brentano’s theoretical apparatus provides 
the means for a plausible naïve realist account of perception. However, I certainly do not 
think Brentano avails himself of these means to adopt this view.
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that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are all based on 
questionable—and ultimately untenable—ontological presuppositions.
2 Insight and Innovation in the Work of Brentano
I must state at the outset that my interest here is not in Brentano per se. This is, 
then, by no means a work in Brentanian scholarship. Rather, I am interested in 
this ingenious thinker because one finds in his writings a fruitful view of mind 
and an original theory of judgment that are useful—within a certain ontologi-
cal framework, one that Brentano seems to presume—in illuminating how 
one can engage the world in a particularly direct and intimate way. I do not 
take myself to be articulating Brentano’s general position on how one engages 
the world via one’s mind, and so it is irrelevant to my objectives if Brentano 
himself would reject my applications of his insights.
Brentano’s magnum opus is Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Al-
though his views underwent various changes and refinements over his career, 
this book contains the crux of those views, the basis of later development. As 
its title suggests, Brentano’s stated object in the book is to establish, with “ex-
perience alone” as his teacher, “a single unified science of psychology”, one that 
would be on equal standing with mathematics, physics, chemistry and physi-
ology.3 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint contains a wealth of care-
ful discussion and innovative views regarding mental phenomena and their 
study. Although an account of knowledge of things in themselves is clearly not 
among Brentano’s goals in this work, I contend that it contains the theoretical 
resources for just such an account. In this section, I sketch the features of Bren-
tano’s theory of mind and mental phenomena that make feasible the account.
 Intentionality
The notion most associated with Brentano is intentionality. The use of this no-
tion is his key insight. Though certainly insightful, its use cannot really be re-
garded as innovative for, as Brentano himself notes, he is merely reintroducing 
a scholastic notion from the Middle Ages. The notion is key because it pro-
vides him with the means of defining the very subject matter of psychology. 
According to him, one is aware of but two sorts of thing, physical and mental 
phenomena. (I maintain below that one is aware of much more, but that an 
account of this awareness is beyond the purview of psychology, Brentano’s 
3 See the Foreword to the 1874 edition, included in the 1995 Routledge edition. All references to 
this work are to the latter.
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focus here.) Brentano considers several ways of distinguishing these two sorts, 
but concludes the best is in terms of the intentional inexistence—or immanent 
objectivity—of mental phenomena: each such phenomenon is directed towards 
or about something (which might or might not exist). Physical phenomena, 
for example “a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, 
warmth, cold, odor which I sense,” (Brentano 1874, 79–80) do not display such 
a pointing beyond themselves. Psychology is devoted to obtaining an account 
of one’s awareness of mental phenomena, as well as to classifying them and 
articulating their relations.
Despite this foundational role that intentionality plays in his enterprise, 
Brentano says nothing about it per se. Indeed, the term ‘intentionality’ does 
not appear in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. This leaves quite open 
how to understand the notion. Given his initial use, one might be tempted to 
regard intentionality as a feature of a mental phenomenon, that is, of a men-
tal state, to wit, the relational feature that makes that state about something 
or the (relational) feature that state exhibits when it is so directed. Such con-
struals of intentionality as a feature of a mental state seem largely taken for 
granted in contemporary discussions of the philosophy of mind.
I believe they are misguided. To regard intentionality as a relational feature 
of a mental state—or as constitutively relational—yields intractable problems 
in connection to mental states about what does not exist. More importantly, 
if one accepts (as Brentano does and I do) that intentionality is in some sense 
essential to the mental, then to regard intentionality as in the first instance a 
feature of a mental state is to overlook how there are such exceptional states at 
all. There are, I submit, intentional states because there are minds. Thus, inten-
tionality should be regarded not as a feature of a mental state, but rather as a 
feature of a mind. It is the capacity, the definitive feature of a mind, to be relat-
ed to another thing in a unique way: to be related so as to allow consideration. 
A mind just is a thing with intentionality, and it is the only such thing.4 There 
is, then, no accounting for the unique relation intentionality enables except in 
mental terms. Although, in appropriate circumstances, intentionality enables 
a unique relation, the capacity is not relational per se. It is non-relational in 
4 Thus, I concur with Uriah Kriegel’s interpretation of Brentano that intentionality is a feature 
of the subject of a mental act, rather than a mental state, but disagree that this is the feature 
of phenomenal intentionality, a felt directedness, and think that Kriegel overstates his point 
when he claims that intentionality “has nothing to do with mental states’ capacity to track 
elements in the environment.” (Kriegel (forthcoming): Chapter 2) Intentionality, as I under-
stand it, is the capacity that gives rise to phenomenal intentionality and also makes possible 
any state that tracks elements in one’s environment.
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the sense that intentionality, this capacity, does not need a relatum, something 
in addition to its bearer, to exist or to be manifest. As I take up below, this un-
derstanding of a mind and of intentionality is consistent with what Brentano 
writes in the opening pages of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and 
the framework it illustrates is crucial to an account of knowledge of things in 
themselves.
 A Heterodox Tripartite Classification of Mental Phenomena
Brentano argues that there are no unconscious mental states: no mental state 
that is not the object of some mental state. Furthermore, he argues that one 
is infallible with respect to one’s own mental states as revealed through inner 
consciousness and judged via inner perception. He considers arguments that 
purport to establish that the latter is infallible, but dismisses these as falla-
cious, concluding that its infallibility is “immediately evident … Thus, there is 
no need to justify our confidence in inner perception.” (Brentano 1874, 140) So 
there are some mental states that are evident without further justification from 
other mental states (or anything else). One sees here Brentano’s allegiance to a 
principal tenet of foundationalism.
Two more significant insights in Brentano’s work are a heterodox5 classifica-
tion of mental phenomena and an account of the dependent relations among 
these classes. According to Brentano, both the classification and the relations 
are revealed by inner consciousness. What it reveals is that “Every mental act is 
conscious; it includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every men-
tal act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary 
object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary ob-
ject the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in 
which the sound is heard. Consciousness of this secondary object is three-fold: 
it involves a presentation of it, a cognition of it and a feeling toward it.” (Bren-
tano 1874, 153–154) Thus, there are but three classes of mental phenomena: pre-
sentations, judgments and emotions (what Brentano calls “phenomena of love 
and hate”). Each mental state is a complex of all three classes; in the simplest 
case, a mental phenomenon is a presentation—as basis—a judgment with re-
spect to this basis, and a positive or negative emotion toward it.6
5 Brentano’s classificatory scheme is different from the orthodoxy of Aristotle or that of Kant, 
which was adopted by most of his contemporaries; it cannot be considered innovative, for 
the scheme is shared by Descartes (though Brentano did demur to certain details of the Car-
tesian scheme).
6 Brentano later rejected this view that every mental state includes an emotion. I set this detail 
aside, for it is not relevant to the substance of my discussion.
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 An Original Theory of Judgment
One might be dubious of this last point, regarding the inherent treble com-
plexity of each mental phenomenon, which I present as a significant insight. 
Consider the straightforward sort of case that Brentano introduces to illustrate 
the point: an act of hearing. In regards to such an act, the appropriate atten-
dant judgment (in normal circumstances) would be affirmative; through inner 
consciousness one simply accepts the act of hearing (and thereby the sound 
heard). On the standard account of judgment, though, a judgment consists in 
the combination of two things: one, the subject of the judgment—the second, 
some property of the first. In this case of simple acceptance, however, it seems 
the only relevant property is existence. Awareness would then consist of com-
bining this act of hearing with existence. Yet not only is existence suspect as a 
property, the supposition that anyone, even the smallest child, must have the 
concept of existence (which would be needed to combine the property of ex-
istence with something) and must apply it to an act of hearing in order to be 
aware of this act—that is, in order to hear—is incredible.
Considerations such as these lead to what is perhaps Brentano’s greatest 
innovation, to wit, an original theory of judgment. By means of this theory, 
he is able to defend the foregoing point about the treble complexity of each 
mental phenomenon. There are two key features of this novel theory. The first 
is that every judgment is ultimately existential, pertaining to the existence or 
non-existence of something. However, in order to avoid the sort of problem 
just considered, Brentano denies that existence is part of the content of the 
judgment. Some thing is not judged to be existent via the application of the 
concept of existence to that thing; its being an existent thing is not what is 
judged. Rather, in the judgement, that thing is judged to be and accepted (in a 
positive case) as existing; as being existent is how the thing is judged therein, 
and this is the mark of judgment.7 Despite every judgment being existential, 
neither existence—nor any less contentious property—need be included in 
judgment. Consequently, since a thing itself can be the appropriate content 
of a judgment,8 a judgment need not involve the combination of a subject 
7 Kreigel expresses this pivotal insight in the following way: “The existence-affirmation is not 
an aspect of what the judgment presents but how it presents” (Kriegel (forthcoming): Chap-
ter 4). Johannes Brandl expresses the point in terms of the content versus the quality of the 
judgment: a judgment, like other mental states, has a thing as content, but has the distinc-
tive quality of accepting (rejecting) that thing as existent (or non-existent). (Brandl 2014) 
Both Brandl and Kriegel provide very useful expositions of Brentano’s iconoclastic theory of 
judgment.
8 For much of his career, Brentano distinguished between the content (Inhalt) and the matter 
(Materie) of a judgment. The content of the judgment the table exists is supposed to be the 
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and property that is evaluable as true or false. Thus, the second key feature of 
Brentano’s theory of judgment is that it is broadly reistic (or objectual) rather 
than propositional. One judges—accepts or rejects—things, not that things 
are thus-and-so. These two features make Brentano’s theory of judgment quite 
different from any accepted by his predecessors or by almost every philoso-
pher today.
Brentano says much in defense of his classification of mental phenomena, 
the treble complexity of each such state and, especially, his theory of judg-
ment. For present purposes, I take these insights and this innovative theory 
for granted. My main objective is to show how they can be combined with an 
appropriate understanding of intentionality—in a certain ontological frame-
work—to yield a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things 
in themselves.
3 Descriptive Psychology or Ontology and a Metaphysics of Mind?
From the theoretical resources introduced in the previous section, one can 
 develop a plausible naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of 
things in themselves. This is likely surprising to anyone with some familiar-
ity of the context in which these resources are presented. This context, how-
ever, merely hides an ontological framework indispensable to the proposed 
epistemology.
 Brentano’s Apparent Phenomenalism, Clear Indirect Realism and 
Limited Foundationalism
In as prominent a place as the analytical table of contents of Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano writes: “Physical phenomena can exist only 
phenomenally; mental phenomena exist in reality as well”.9 In the text of this 
section, Brentano concludes: “we will nevertheless make no mistake if in gen-
eral we deny to physical phenomena any existence other than intentional 
being of the table; the matter of this judgment is supposed to be the table itself. Given a suit-
able account of what a thing is, I do not believe the being of a thing is anything at all; if it is, 
it is merely that thing itself. Since the distinction between content and matter turns on what 
seems to me to be an untenable ontological distinction, I reject the former one (as Brentano 
came to, as well). Regardless of the distinction between content and matter, the key point 
in the text holds: a judgment need not involve the combination of a subject and property. I 
thank Guillaume Fréchette for discussion of Brentano’s views here.
9 Book Two, Chapter i, Section 7. Brentano 1874: vii.
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 existence,” (Brentano 1874, 94) and adds in a subsequent section that men-
tal phenomena are “the only phenomena which possess actual existence in 
addition to intentional existence.” (Brentano 1874, 97–98) Earlier in the text, 
he states: “We have no right … to believe that the objects of so-called exter-
nal perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably 
do not exist outside of us. In contrast to that which really and truly exists, 
they are mere phenomena.” (Brentano 1874, 10) Such claims certainly suggest 
a sort of idealism, a phenomenalism on which those things that appear to ex-
ist independently of any mind in fact are somehow constructed from mental 
phenomena.
These claims are puzzling in light of the many more passages in the text 
where, endorsing an indirect or representational realism familiar from modern 
philosophy, Brentano acknowledges physical things existing independently of 
any mind.10 Still, even granting such things that give rise to one’s experiences 
of physical phenomena, it is clear—at least at this point in his thinking11—that 
Brentano believes one can know little about them: “We can say that there ex-
ists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that sensation. 
We can probably also prove that there must be relations among these realities 
similar to those which are manifested by spatial phenomena shapes and sizes. 
But this is as far as we can go. We have no experience of that which truly exists, 
in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true. The truth of physi-
cal phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth”. (Brentano 1874, 19) Deeper 
in the text, he amplifies this indirect realism: “We can say that such realities 
exist and can attribute to them certain relative properties. But what and how 
they are in and for themselves remains completely inconceivable to us. Conse-
quently, even if the physiology of the brain had reached its full development, it 
could give us no more information concerning the true nature of the realities 
with which these acquired dispositions are connected than pure psychological 
reflection could. It would tell us only about certain physical phenomena which 
are caused by the same unknown X.” (Brentano 1874, 60)
As noted above, Brentano maintains that one is infallible regarding one’s 
own mental states as revealed through inner consciousness. One’s judgements 
about these states, regarding their contents and other qualities, are directly 
10 For Brentano’s faithful student and editor’s, Kraus’, vehement denial that Brentano was a 
phenomenalist, see Ibid: 94, 402.
11 In much later work, published posthumously (Brentano 1925), Brentano argues against 
Kant’s claim that things in themselves are unknowable. This work remains untranslated 
from the original German. I thank Johannes Brandl for bringing relevant passages to my 
attention.
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evident, requiring no justification from other mental states. It is obvious, then, 
that Brentano accepts immediate justification: one knows one’s own mental 
states, and the justification for such knowledge is not inferred or derived. Pre-
sumably, for he suggests nothing to the contrary, Brentano thinks that justifica-
tion for all of one’s judgments in the end derives from one’s (infallible) judg-
ments about one’s own mental states, and so he is a foundationalist.
Although Brentano acknowledges that one makes judgments regarding the 
existence and features of things in the world, he holds that these judgments 
are “blind”. They are wholly unjustified and, though useful, are the result of 
instinct and become habitual.12 If a blind judgment about something indepen-
dent of one’s mind were ever to acquire any justification, it seems it would 
come on the basis of a probabilistic inference. From the regularity of one’s 
mental phenomena in certain circumstances, one would infer the likely pres-
ence of a uniform cause. However, unless the inductive principle on which 
such an inference is based were itself justified, it does not seem like any judg-
ment on which it relies could be justified. Yet it is not obvious where the jus-
tification for such an inductive principle could be found. It seems unlikely, to 
say the least, that it would be found among one’s mental phenomena, but it 
is only one’s judgments concerning such states that need no further justifica-
tion. Consequently, it seems one’s justification and, hence, knowledge, cannot 
extend beyond the foundations of one’s knowledge of one’s own mental states. 
Brentano’s foundationalism is, therefore, just the sort that threatens skepti-
cism, casting doubt on the legitimacy of all judgments about anything beyond 
one’s own mind.13
 Different Projects vis-à-vis Mind
In light of the foregoing, it seems that Brentano had little sympathy for  direct 
realism (let alone naïve realism). He accepts that there are things exist-
ing independently of any mind, but seems to maintain these are largely un-
knowable. Defending direct realism is, then, certainly not among his goals in 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Moreover, although he is clearly a 
12 In several places in his editorial notes to Brentano 1874, Kraus attributes such a view to 
Brentano. However, at no point in this work does Brentano discuss “blind judgments”. He 
does employ this notion in the fragments and correspondence collected in Brentano 1930. 
See pages 37, 38, 69, 75, 80 (page numbers refer to the 2009 e-Library edition).
13 Richard Fumerton, a foundationalist, attributes much of the resistance to foundation-
alism to the concern that it cannot avoid skepticism. See Fumerton 2001: 18–19. In the 
posthumous work cited in Note 11 above, Brentano, considering Hume, maintains that 
skepticism can be avoided by means of analytic judgments and probabilistic inferences. 
An evaluation of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper.
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 foundationalist, he seems to espouse a variety of this position that is not easily 
extended to justified belief about things beyond one’s own mental phenom-
ena. As such, his foundationalism appears ill-suited for an account of knowl-
edge of things in themselves. These epistemological issues, however, are not 
Brentano’s concern in this work.
Consider two projects vis-à-vis mind that one might undertake. One might 
restrict one’s attention to features of a mind per se, thereby focusing exclu-
sively on mental phenomena, things that depend for their existence on a mind. 
The goals of such a project might be to discern the variety of mental phenom-
ena and their relations, irrespective of anything beyond them. Or one might con-
sider a mind to determine, first, what such a thing is in order to focus on how 
such a thing relates to other things in the world, most of which do not depend 
for their existence on any mind. Here what is beyond a mind is precisely the fo-
cus of the project, for its purpose is to discern how a mind relates to these things 
(and vice versa). In the first project, connections between mind and world are 
irrelevant; in the latter, they are essential. Both projects are important if one 
is to understand not only the workings of a mind, but the place of mind in the 
world.
A survey of the contents of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint indi-
cates that in this work Brentano’s project is clearly of the former sort. Later, 
Brentano characterizes this project as descriptive psychology.14 If one takes 
the crux of epistemology to be the relations between a mind and the world 
(and, perhaps, a subjective awareness of these), then given its limited scope 
and purposes, descriptive psychology is not epistemological. Indeed it is inimi-
cal to epistemology insofar as it disregards what is independent of any mind. 
Moreover, as noted in the introduction, epistemology is posterior to metaphys-
ics, yet descriptive psychology is presented as eschewing metaphysics. At the 
very beginning of his book, Brentano characterizes psychology as the science 
of the soul, where a soul is a substance, “the substantial bearer of presenta-
tions and other activities which are based upon presentations.” (Brentano 1874, 
5) This is a metaphysical characterization of the subject, with a focus on the 
14 Brentano distinguishes descriptive psychology from genetic psychology. See Brentano 
1982. The latter is only indirectly (if at all) a metaphysical-cum-epistemological project 
of the second sort that I characterize above. The primary focus of genetic psychology is 
the relations between mental phenomena and the physiological states of an organism. A 
failure to recognize in his early work a distinction between descriptive psychology and 
a metaphysical-cum-epistemological project pertaining to mind (of the sort pursued in 
later work, e.g. Brentano 1925) perhaps explains Brentano’s puzzling claims redolent of 
phenomenalism.
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 substance that has mental phenomena, raising the questions of what exactly 
this  substance is, what a thing more generally is, and how this substance is 
related to other things.
But Brentano, well aware of the leeriness most have toward metaphysics 
(then as today),15 and not wanting to undermine from the outset his efforts 
to establish psychology as a serious science, seeks to downplay the metaphys-
ics in his investigation. In a conciliatory move to accommodate those who are 
suspicious of a soul—and metaphysics more generally—Brentano offers a dif-
ferent characterization of psychology: “We, therefore, define psychology as the 
science of mental phenomena.” (Brentano 1874, 19. The italics are mine.) Mental 
phenomena, those “‘mental states’, ‘mental processes,’ and ‘mental events,’ as 
inner perception reveals them to us,” (Brentano 1874, 10) are taken to be indu-
bitable and, as such, unimpeachable. This alternative characterization, which 
is presented as a slight change of focus, in fact has profound theoretical conse-
quences. In this change, one has the source of the method of phenomenologi-
cal reduction, the seeds of Husserlian epoché. A science of mental phenomena, 
of dependent features of a mind, is an investigation that is, by design, cut off 
from the world independent of mind and, thus, rather limited.
However, one cannot undertake any substantive inquiry without some on-
tological assumptions (too often left implicit) pertaining to what a thing is and 
how things relate so as to compose the world. There are, therefore, ontological 
and more specific metaphysical underpinnings in Brentano’s work. These are 
revealed by his original characterization of psychology, as the science of the 
soul, and of his use of the notion of substance. Both indicate an Aristotelian 
framework (and, of course, Brentano’s thought is steeped in Aristotelianism). 
Given such a framework, the world consists of natured entities—things that are 
constrained in their being and are so-constrained simply because of what they 
are—standing in necessary relations. These entities, including the relations to 
which they give rise, structure the world and are as they are independently of 
the organizational or classificatory activity of any mind. They are the ultimate 
bases of rational investigation. I am sympathetic to just such an ontology and 
accompanying metaphysics, and have defended both elsewhere.16
Within this Aristotelian framework, the resources introduced in the pre-
ceding section can be deployed in order to answer the crucial epistemologi-
cal question regarding the bounds of one’s knowledge of the world. I argue 
15 Speaking of psychology, Brentano states: “There is no area of knowledge, with the single 
exception of metaphysics, which the great mass of people look upon with greater con-
tempt.” (Brentano 1874, 3).
16 See Fiocco 2015 and my “What Is a Thing?”. Also see Note 34 below.
 M. Oreste Fiocco
grazer philosophische studien 94 (2017) 332-358
<UN>
344
that the means are here for a plausible naïve realist, foundationalist account 
of knowledge of things in themselves. As noted above, the account I give is 
not supposed to be Brentano’s; from this point my project ceases to be in any 
way exegetical. It is, nevertheless, Brentanian, an application of Brentano’s 
insights and innovation in an attempt to answer a perennial philosophical 
question.
4 Intentionality and Acquaintance
It has proven difficult to say much substantial and, thus, illuminating about the 
relational mental state that is supposed to enable direct engagement between 
a mind and some other thing (be it a property, a fact or something more mun-
dane, such as a tree), a state traditionally called acquaintance.17 Usually those 
who make theoretical use of this state rely on a negative characterization—
acquaintance is unmediated or immediate—or a spatial metaphor—it puts a 
thing in mind or before it—or a combination of the two—when a mind is ac-
quainted with a thing there is nothing between the two.18 The state is supposed 
to be simple and, hence, unamenable to definition or robust characterization; 
those who make use of it seem to acquiesce to this.19
Yet one might want more for a state that is supposed to play a crucial role 
in an account of how a mind relates to things. Indeed, one needs more if one 
is to defend the controversial claim that it is via acquaintance that one can 
know things pristinely and without mediation. The account of intentionality 
17 The locus classicus of this tradition is Russell 1910–11. There are many who make use of 
acquaintance in contemporary discussions. See, for just a few examples, BonJour 2003, 
2001; Brewer 2011, 1999; Chalmers 2010; Fales 1996; Fumerton 2001a, 1995; Gertler 2012, 2011, 
2001; Martin 2001. For an older source, see Lewis 1946.
18 See, for one instance, Fumerton 2001a: 14. Fumerton acknowledges that metaphors here 
are “as likely to be misleading as helpful.”
19 It is interesting to note that although in general Russell treats acquaintance as simple and 
unanalyzable, he is not committed to it being so. As an anonymous referee pointed out to 
me, in his 1913 unpublished Theory of Knowledge manuscript, Russell says, “It is not neces-
sary to assume that acquaintance is unanalyzable, or that subjects must be simple; it may 
be found that a further analysis of both is possible. But I have no analysis to suggest, and 
therefore formally both will appear as if they were simple, though nothing will be falsi-
fied if they are found to be not simple.” (45) This referee also observed that in some places 
Russell characterizes acquaintance in terms of presentation, suggesting the influence of 
Brentano and Brentano’s student, Meinong (whose work was introduced to Russell by his 
teachers James Ward and G.F. Stout).
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as a (non-relational) capacity of a mind, proposed above, considered within 
an Aristotelian framework provides the basis of a robust characterization of 
acquaintance.
 Acquaintance as Passive Intentionality
So assume that a thing just is a natured entity: it is constrained in its being 
and is as it is because of what it is, and because it is as it is, it (necessarily) 
relates to other things as it does. The world comprises all the things there are 
and is structured by them, by the relations holding among things in virtue 
of what they are. Within this natural structure are minds. A mind is a thing 
with intentionality, the capacity to be related to (and to relate to) some other 
thing in a unique way—to be related so as to allow consideration. According 
to Brentano, a mind has three general classes of state, so a mind can interact 
with other things in but three ways: it can present a thing, judge a thing or 
love (or hate) a thing. As Brentano notes, among these states, presentation 
“deserves the primary place, for it is the simplest of the three phenomena, 
while judgement and love always include a presentation within them.” (Bren-
tano 1874, 266) A state of presentation is, then, the basic link between a mind 
and some other thing. It is in terms of presentation that acquaintance is to 
be understood.
Throughout Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano disregards 
significant differences between imaginings and sensations, classifying both 
as presentations. These two specific classes of presentational state are indeed 
similar in important respects: both introduce a thing to a mind, neither in-
volves the positive–negative duality of judgment or feeling, neither in itself 
seems to depend on a judgment or feeling. For the purposes of descriptive psy-
chology, then, it seems entirely appropriate to subsume the two states under 
presentation. However, if one’s interests are epistemological, in examining the 
connections between a mind and things independent of mind, the differences 
between these two kinds of state become salient. The most important of these 
is that an imagining requires a certain spontaneity—a mental activeness—
that a sensation seems not to.
This difference among presentations can be explained and thereby eluci-
dated in terms of intentionality. Like other capacities, intentionality can be 
either passive or active. Consider the capacity of a stone to both be warmed 
and to warm or that of wax to be shaped and to shape. Hence, in virtue of a 
single capacity, in some circumstances a thing can be the agent, and in oth-
ers the recipient. Consequently, a mind—something with the capacity of 
intentionality— can passively yield a thing in presentation, yet it can also ac-
tively proffer a thing in presentation. It does both in virtue of intentionality. 
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So there are active and passive presentational states of mind. There also ap-
pear to be  different kinds of passive presentational states. There are sensations, 
which occur when a mind is activated by something in space via one of the 
senses. There are also, it seems, intuitions, which occur when a mind is acti-
vated by something not in space (or not in time).20 Call any state of passive 
presentational engagement of a mind acquaintance.
Acquaintance enables unmediated engagement between a mind and some 
other thing—there is nothing between the mind and that thing—because the 
mind is wholly passive, making no contribution to the engagement. There is no 
mental particular (like a sense datum), nor any representation produced that 
might occlude the engagement or even be constitutive of it. As presentational, 
the engagement is intentional, and so requires the existence of the mind so 
engaged, but given its passivity in acquaintance, the engagement also requires 
the existence of the thing with which the mind is engaged. Without either, this 
very state of acquaintance could not exist, and because the mind is wholly pas-
sive, the features of this state are determined by the natured entity acquainting 
itself with the mind. Thus, this relational state of a mind and thing could not 
be more intimate.
Intentionality itself, as a capacity, is not relational, but it is precisely this 
capacity that enables a mind to be—passively—in such an intimate relational 
state, one that requires the existence of the thing with which the mind is pre-
sentationally related. Nevertheless, it is this very capacity of intentionality that 
also enables a mind to be—actively—in a non-relational presentational state, 
as when one imagines a mountain of gold. Some might doubt that it is possible 
for a mind to be totally passive in its engagement with a thing. I address such 
doubts in the final section below.21
 Acquaintance and Naïve Realism
It is acquaintance that makes possible knowledge of things in themselves. 
From a metaphysical vantage, acquaintance is simply a relation between two 
things (in the most inclusive sense). Given that acquaintance is presentational, 
that is, intentional, one of these things must be a mind; however, the other 
relatum could be literally anything: a property, a familiar concrete object, a 
number, a kind, a fact, etc. Some things that contribute to the world depend for 
their existence on a mind and some do not; some exist in space, some do not; 
some exist in time, some do not; some have instances, some do not; some are 
bigger than a breadbox, some are not—the variety of things is staggering, but 
20 Recall Russell, who maintained that one can be acquainted with universals.
21 In Fiocco 2015, I argue that such passive engagement must be possible.
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each, qua thing, has the same status. Each, as a natured entity, makes its own 
contribution to the world (as determined by what it is). So each is as suitable 
as any other to be an object of acquaintance.
This account of acquaintance can address the misgivings of those who, 
while accepting acquaintance (as a state of immediate presentation), limit its 
application to features of a mind. Such philosophers reject a direct realist—
and, a fortiori, a naïve realist—account of perception and would consequently 
deny that acquaintance can provide knowledge of things in themselves. Thus, 
Laurence BonJour maintains that any account on which a mind can be ac-
quainted with, say, a bell tower, is “metaphysically unintelligible. Phenomenal-
ism and similar idealistic views aside, I simply do not understand how mate-
rial objects, understood in a realist way, can be literally parts of experiences.” 
(BonJour 2004, Note 32) The experience in question is, however, a (passive) 
relational presentational state; the bell tower can literally be part of it in the 
sense that that state could not be as it is—nor even exist—in the absence of 
the bell tower.
In the same vein, BonJour insists that “Material objects, understood in a 
realist, non-phenomenalist way, are plainly outside the mind, metaphysically 
distinct from any sort of experience or awareness of them, and related to con-
scious experience only via a highly complicated causal chain. They are thus 
inherently incapable of being directly given to consciousness in the way that 
things like sense-data are claimed by the Cartesian to be.”22 First of all, the 
spatial metaphor is inapt; nothing is literally inside or outside a mind. A mind 
is simply a thing with intentionality. A thing can relate no more closely, direct-
ly, intimately with a mind than by being intentionally related to it. Although 
something like a bell tower is certainly metaphysically distinct from any aware-
ness of it—it is a mind-independent thing—this makes it no less suitable as 
an object of acquaintance. A mind can be acquainted with anything, and the 
specific features of that thing, in particular whether it can exist independently 
of a mind, is irrelevant to whether it can stand in a passive relational presen-
tational state with a mind. Whether this intentional state is causal is an open 
question, depending on how one understands causation. Within an Aristote-
lian framework, as I am working in here, causation is an explanatory notion, to 
be understood in terms of the (necessary) connections among things as deter-
mined by what they are. In this light, the causal connection between a mind 
and a thing with which it is acquainted is quite simple: in virtue of its being 
natured, its existence as what it is, a thing activates the intentional capacity 
22 BonJour 2004: 356. Fumerton presses a similar concern against direct realism. See Fumer-
ton 2001b: 76.
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of a mind.23 So, pace BonJour, it is incorrect to claim that some things, such as 
familiar concrete objects, are inherently incapable of acquainting themselves 
with a mind.
There is nothing, then, with which a mind cannot be acquainted. However, 
if acquaintance is a completely passive relational presentational state, in that 
a mind makes no contribution to the relation (other than being a mind), then, 
in particular, a mind employs no concepts in being acquainted with some-
thing. Acquaintance is in no way conceptual, nor even representational.24 This 
raises the question of whether this state is feasibly the basis of knowledge of 
anything.
5 Judgment and Foundationalism
Since acquaintance involves no concepts, and concepts are the means one has 
for differentiating and organizing one’s experience—and, hence, the means of 
having reasons and making rational judgments about the world—one might 
think that acquaintance is not an epistemic state at all. Moreover, given that 
acquaintance is merely relational and not even representational, it seems this 
state is not of the right sort to imply or otherwise support one that is repre-
sentational. Thus, if one presumes that knowledge must be representational, 
acquaintance could not support it. Were this the case, acquaintance would be 
epistemically inert. Yet, above, I maintain that it is acquaintance that makes 
knowledge of things in themselves possible. If this is so, some account is need-
ed of how acquaintance can indeed yield knowledge of things in themselves, 
the foundation of one’s knowledge of the world.
23 This simple causal process is certainly accompanied by distinct, much more complex 
(chemical, physiological, neurological, etc.) causal processes in the case of an embodied 
mind of the sort human persons presumably have.
24 Over his career, David Smith has given a good deal of attention to acquaintance, even de-
voting a book to this subject, see Smith 1989. As indicated by his most recent discussion, 
in Smith 2017, Smith takes acquaintance to have a complex structure partially understood 
in terms of (indexical) content. Thus, according to Smith, acquaintance is a crucially rep-
resentational state, one that has satisfaction conditions that determine the object of that 
state. However, as I characterize it, acquaintance is in no way representational; rather, it 
is entirely and merely relational. It is this subtle yet important difference that makes my 
account of acquaintance—and not Smith’s—compatible with naïve realism.
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 Concerns about “the Given”
It is precisely the concern that there can be no such account that has led to 
the widespread rejection of foundationalism over the last several decades. This 
concern is based on considerations first presented in a debate between Moritz 
Schlick and Carl Hempel25 and developed famously by Wilfrid Sellars in his 
animadversions on “the given”. What Sellars decries as “the myth of the given” 
is the idea that there is acquaintance between a mind and something in the 
world—in the sense of engagement that is direct in being entirely independent 
of any other relation between that mind and the world—where such acquain-
tance provides the bases, the foundations, of all one’s knowledge of the world. 
His argument against the so-called myth is by no means straightforward.26
Its upshot, however, is that in the case of a putative foundational judg-
ment, an example of knowledge justified by something with which a mind is 
acquainted, there are two distinguishable mental phenomena. There is the 
relational state of acquaintance—a presentation—and a judgment regarding 
this presentation. The former is supposed to justify the latter. The problem is 
this: On the one hand, if a presentation presents a thing as being a certain way, 
then that presentation seems suitable as justification, the basis, for the judg-
ment that that thing is indeed that way. However, in this case, the presentation 
would, it seems, have to be conceptual insofar as it presents a thing as being 
a certain way. (One would need, at least, the concept of that way of being.) 
That presentation would not then be direct in the sense of being independent 
of any other relation between that mind and the world, for the presence and 
appropriate application of a concept seems to require prior engagement be-
tween that mind and things that fall under that concept. Moreover, if the pre-
sentation were conceptual—presenting a thing as being a certain way—then 
some justification for judging that thing to in fact be that way would now be 
needed. But such justification is precisely what the presentation was supposed 
to provide. It is implausible and, hence, unsatisfactory merely to assert that 
that thing must be as presented.
On the other hand, if the presentation does not present a thing as being a 
certain way, then it need not be conceptual, and so may be regarded as direct. 
Furthermore, it need not itself require some justification for judging it to be 
apt. But then the presentation is not suitable as justification, the basis, for a 
judgment. This is because a judgment is supposed to be a mental state with the 
content that something is a certain way. If the presentation does not present 
25 See Schlick 1934, 1934/5 and Hempel 1934/5a, 1934/5b.
26 It is developed by many threads in a long and intricate essay. See Sellars 1956.
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a thing as being a certain way, it can provide no support for any judgment. 
Therefore, in neither case, can a presentational state of acquaintance provide 
a justificatory foundation for knowledge.27
 Embracing the Given
The effect of this argument, in various guises, has been enormous. It is un-
critically accepted by such influential figures as Karl Popper, Richard Rorty 
and Donald Davidson, as well as many others.28 Consequently, anyone who 
attempts to defend foundationalism, of any variety, must contend with it.29
Despite the received cogency of the argument, it is easily undermined with 
Brentano’s theory of judgment in combination with the foregoing account of 
acquaintance as passive intentionality. Thus, it does not present a problem 
to the naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge being propounded 
here. To see this, consider a purported case of foundational knowledge of a 
thing in itself, for example, my knowledge of the rectangular stone bell tower 
(with a bulbous patinated cupola) outside my window. Via my mind, I am ac-
quainted with this bell tower. This acquaintance is a relational presentational 
state that, to indulge in a metaphor, just impresses the bell tower upon my 
mind. Passive in this engagement, my mind makes no contribution to it; in 
particular, it employs no concepts. (Concepts are, of course, employed in my 
articulation of this experience, but this is an act posterior to—and made pos-
sible by—the initial, passive confrontation with the bell tower.) The bell tower 
as it is is constitutive of this very state of acquaintance, so this rectangular 
stone bell tower is presented to my mind in all its complexity, though it need 
not be presented as a bell tower or as a rectangular thing or as one made of 
stone.
The state of acquaintance is, then, not conceptual; nothing is presented as 
being a certain way. Nevertheless, this state is a suitable basis—an apt justifica-
tory foundation—for a judgment, to wit, the acceptance of the stone bell tow-
er. Here Brentano’s theory of judgment is crucial. On this theory, a judgment 
is not, in the first instance, a mental state with the content that something is 
27 For other succinct accounts of Sellars’ sprawling argument, see BonJour 2001: 23–24 and 
Fumerton 2001a: 13.
28 See Popper 1959: §§ 25–30, Rorty 1979: Chapters 3 and 4, Davidson 1983. For an account of 
the significance of the argument see Rorty’s introduction to the Harvard University Press 
edition of Sellars 1956.
29 See, again, BonJour 2001 and Fumerton 2001a, for two prominent examples. For an excel-
lent discussion of this style of argument, presented as the Master Argument for coherent-
ism, see Pryor 2014.
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a certain way (though there are the means here for more complicated judg-
ments to this effect). Rather, it is a mental state of accepting (as existing) what 
is presented to one’s mind. That the presentation does not present a thing as 
being a certain way is, therefore, irrelevant to its epistemic force. The judg-
ment has, as a part, the presentation of a rectangular stone bell tower, which 
is as it is because the bell tower is as it is. Because the bell tower is constitutive 
of this state, the state could not present the bell tower incorrectly (nor could 
it exist without it). My justification for accepting the rectangular stone bell 
tower is that I am being presented with that very rectangular stone bell tower; 
the judgment is appropriate because it is the acceptance of the presentation, 
which must be correct. I could be in no better epistemic position with respect 
to knowing the stone bell tower. The presentation of it is accessible via inner 
consciousness, which cannot mislead, and the judgment is just the acceptance 
of this presentation (and thereby its object). In general, with regards to percep-
tion, one has reason to accept things as presented because the act of judgment 
has as part a presentational state, whose presence is indubitable and which 
could not be incorrect.30
Therefore, one can have pristine knowledge of things and without any 
mediation, where one’s justification for this is internally accessible and non-
inferential. One’s knowledge of these things in themselves can then serve as 
the foundation of further knowledge of the world, which just comprises all 
such things.
6 Acquaintance and Disjunctivism
This naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in them-
selves, on which one’s justification for knowing something in the world is an 
internally accessible state of acquaintance, is open to a pressing objection. 
Many philosophers, some of whom are staunch foundationalists, maintain 
that one cannot know directly mind-independent features of the world on the 
basis of internally accessible justification. This is because of the possibility of 
illusions or hallucinations, non-veridical presentational states that appear to 
be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical ones.
30 This is not to deny that one can be mistaken about the world around one. However, the 
complications involved in such cases need not be considered here. My focus is on the best 
case scenario in which one is in fact acquainted with something and one simply accepts 
this thing as it is.
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The concern is that a case in which one is acquainted with a bell tower—
and so knows the bell tower—is indistinguishable, from the perspective of the 
knower, from a case in which one is, say, hallucinating a bell tower (with the 
same appearance). Because the cases seem to be subjectively indistinguish-
able, the presentational states in each are presumably the same, and so any 
internally accessible justification one could have for knowing the bell tower 
must be available in both cases. However, since one cannot know a bell tower 
when one is merely hallucinating such a thing—and one has, it seems, just the 
same epistemic resources available by reflection in this case as one in which 
there actually is a bell tower—one cannot know via acquaintance the bell tow-
er even when it is before one.31
This sort of objection to a naïve realist foundationalism is based on the mis-
taken presumption that the same epistemic resources are available to a subject 
in both veridical and non-veridical presentations. This is incorrect because the 
two presentational states are quite different, and these differences are relevant 
to their epistemic standing. In the present context, the differences between a 
state of acquaintance and an hallucination can be characterized in terms of 
the passivity of the former and the essential activity of the later. Both states 
are intentional, in particular, presentational, and both have, perhaps, the same 
phenomenal feel. Nonetheless, a mind must do more to present a bell tower 
when none is there than when one is, and can just acquaint itself with that 
mind. This crucial difference distinguishes the states not only metaphysically, 
but also epistemically. The passive, relational state of acquaintance is factive, 
providing the best sort of justification for accepting the bell tower; the active 
non-relational hallucinatory state provides no justification. In recent work, 
several philosophers have defended an epistemological disjunctivism similar 
in general respects to the sort I sketch here.32
One might concede that a state of acquaintance and a similar hallucinatory 
state are indeed different, but press the objection by insisting that their dif-
ferences are irrelevant epistemically. After all, despite these differences, they 
seem no more distinguishable via reflection, and if one’s justification for ac-
cepting the bell tower is a veridical state that cannot be told apart from a non-
veridical one, it seems one still has no justification considering only this state. 
This sort of objection presumes that one must in all cases be able to discrimi-
nate between relevant alternatives if one is to have (perceptual) knowledge. 
31 Such an argument, presented by foundationalists, can be found at BonJour 2004: 363 and 
is suggested at Fumerton 2001a: 15–16.
32 See, for example, Pritchard 2012, Byrne and Logue 2008, Snowdon 2005 and McDowell 
1995.
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In this case, the relevant alternatives are being acquainted with a bell tower 
before one and merely hallucinating a bell tower (when none is present). This 
presumption is deeply plausible, so there is no dismissing it out of hand.
In defense of his version of epistemological disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard 
gives much consideration to the role discriminatory capacities play in obtain-
ing perceptual knowledge. While recognizing they play an important role, in 
order to avoid urgent epistemological problems that arise independently of 
disjunctivism, he introduces a distinction that indicates it is not necessary in 
all cases for one to be able to discriminate relevant alternatives. The distinc-
tion is between favoring and discriminating epistemic support.33 Pritchard 
argues convincingly that in many cases favoring support, evidence that indi-
cates one alternative is more likely than another, can yield knowledge even in 
the absence of the ability to discriminate introspectively between the relevant 
alternatives. Thus, for example, one might be looking at a zebra and thereby 
acquire favoring support that one is looking at a zebra rather than a cleverly 
disguised mule. This support, in conjunction with other considerations (con-
cerning the cost of disguising a mule, the difficulty of doing so, its unlikeli-
hood, etc.) can, it seems, yield knowledge that one is looking at a zebra rather 
than a cleverly disguised mule, even though one cannot discriminate the two.
In being acquainted with a bell tower before one, then, one’s passive pre-
sentational state need only provide favoring support for accepting the bell 
tower. It certainly is able to do this, for the state is factive: it does not merely 
make it likely that there is a bell tower before one, it entails the presence of 
the bell tower. Consequently, this state precludes hallucinating a bell tower 
or any other alternative in which there is no bell tower before one. Hence, the 
state itself can yield knowledge without other considerations (pertaining to 
the likelihood of there being a bell tower before one). Of course, one might be 
unable to tell by the intentional or phenomenal features of the state whether 
it is an hallucination, but—bearing in mind the distinction between favoring 
and discriminating epistemic support—it does not follow that one does not 
know a bell tower when acquainted with one. Therefore, this objection to a 
naïve realist foundationalism based on the possibility of illusion or hallucina-
tion is misplaced.
Note that given the Aristotelian framework underlying this discussion—one 
on which the world comprises natured entities and their myriad relations—
the sort of metaphysical-cum-epistemological disjunctivism proposed here 
is entirely appropriate. Indeed, this framework can even be seen as requiring 
and, hence, justifying such disjunctivism: Where there is no thing of one kind, 
33 See Pritchard 2012: Part Two.
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in this case the bell tower, the explanation of the appearance of such a thing 
must be some entirely different thing, viz., a (non-relational) presentational 
state of a mind.
7 Conclusion: The Questionable Ontological Basis of Epistemological 
Misgivings
I have propounded an account of knowledge of things in themselves, one 
based on acquaintance—where this is the passive activation of a mind’s na-
ture, its capacity for intentionality—and Brentano’s novel theory of judgment. 
In the preceding three sections, I entertain familiar misgivings concerning this 
sort of naïve realist, foundationalist epistemology. These concerns are to the 
effect that not enough can be said about acquaintance to make it feasible, and 
even granting such a relational state it cannot establish a connection between 
a mind and something independent of it; that any genuinely direct connection 
between a mind and something independent of it would not be epistemic, and 
so could not serve as a foundation for one’s knowledge of things; that the mere 
presentation of a thing is insufficient to provide internally accessible justifica-
tion for knowing that thing.
In conclusion, I suggest that all these misgivings have a common source: a 
certain ontology and corollary view of the structure in the world. On this ontol-
ogy, a variety of realism, there are things independently of any conscious be-
ing; yet a thing is not natured and, hence, its very existence does not constrain 
what it is, nor the features it has. Nothing must be as it is in itself. Anything 
that exists, though it actually has certain features, nevertheless might (in a 
metaphysical sense) be any way whatsoever, and so can interact with anything 
anyhow. Consequently, there are no necessary connections among things 
themselves. Any necessary connection—any real structure in the world—is 
introduced only via the classificatory, that is, conceptual, activity of conscious 
beings. Therefore, any constraint on how the world is experienced and so any 
explanation of how things do in fact interact in regular (law-like) ways must 
take recourse to the classificatory capacities and practices of conscious beings. 
Ignoring these capacities and practices, there are things, but they are not de-
terminate enough to be known; ignoring these capacities and practices, there 
is really nothing to be known about the world independent of one’s mind.
This ontological view, broadly Kantian and arising from Humean empiricist 
assumptions about one’s experience of the world, is widely taken for granted. 
Indeed, it seems to be held unquestioningly by a majority of contemporary 
philosophers. It is the underlying dogma of analytic philosophy, the heritage 
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of summary rejection of a decrepit scholasticism at the beginning of modern 
philosophy, and subsequent empiricism, idealism, positivism, and vague anti-
realisms. On this view, there is nothing to be known about a thing in itself and 
so—of course!—any claim to know a thing in itself is suspect.
Against the backdrop of such a view, the familiar misgivings concerning an 
account of knowledge of things in themselves are not only credible, they are 
compelling. If acquaintance is supposed to be a direct, that is, non-conceptual, 
connection between a mind and some determinate thing independent of it, 
then there can be no such connection, for the determinacy of a thing requires 
conceptual activity. Moreover, if knowing a thing requires the determinacy of 
that thing, then mere acquaintance, as non-conceptual, cannot provide an 
epistemic connection between a mind and something independent of it. Fi-
nally, if a thing in itself has no nature, then how it presents to a mind is not 
sufficiently determinate or distinctive to provide internally accessible justifica-
tion to accept that thing (rather than something introspectively indistinguish-
able from it).
It is, however, just this sort of ontological view of things and structure that 
I (and Brentano) reject. It is a quite different realism, a broadly Aristotelian 
one, that enables a useful account of intentionality as the definitive feature of 
a mind and a robust characterization of acquaintance.34 It is this Aristotelian 
framework, on which the world comprises natured entities—some of which 
are minds—standing in necessary relations, that makes Brentano’s theory 
of judgment natural.35 Hence, within this alternative ontological framework, 
a plausible naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in 
themselves is forthcoming.
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